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Implications of FTC v. Actavis: A 
Reasonable Approach to Evaluating 
Reverse Payment Settlements 
Diane E. Bieri* 
The Court’s opinion in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.1 resolves the 
important threshold question of the appropriate legal lens 
through which to evaluate patent settlements where 
consideration flows from an innovator drug company to its 
generic challenger.2 The Court rejected both the “presumption 
of illegality” advocated by the FTC and the so-called “scope of 
the patent” test favored by the drug manufacturer defendants, 
holding instead that agreements should be analyzed under the 
rule of reason.3 Thus, reverse payment patent settlements will 
be evaluated on a case by case basis, considering factors 
including “[the payment’s] size, its scale in relation to the 
payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence 
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 1. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 2. Settlements where the innovator drug company provides money or 
something else of value to the generic company have been referred to by 
various names, e.g., “reverse payments,” “pay-for-delay,” “exclusion 
payments.” The terms “pay-for-delay” and “exclusion payments” 
mischaracterize settlements that have brought generic products to market 
months or years before patent expiration. Likewise, the term “reverse 
payment” is imprecise to the extent it implies that these settlements somehow 
stand apart from the norm, as consideration flowing from the innovator to the 
alleged infringer is a typical dynamic in settlements. See Asahi Glass Co. v. 
Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J.) 
(“[A]ny settlement agreement can be characterized as involving ‘compensation’ 
to the defendant, who would not settle unless he had something to show for 
the settlement.”). Yet, the Court adopted the “reverse payment settlements” 
terminology in Actavis, and for ease of reference, I will do the same 
throughout this Article. 
 3. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–31, 2237–38. 
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from other services for which it might represent payment, and 
the lack of any other convincing justification.”4 
In rejecting the scope of the patent test, the Court noted 
that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in 
determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and 
consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a 
patent.”5 Yet even as it acknowledged the relevance of patent 
law, the Court asserted that a “large” payment by the 
innovator to the generic company could signify a weak patent.6 
This dicta seems to reflect some lack of appreciation for the 
Hatch-Waxman statutory framework and the litigation and 
settlement dynamics it has spawned. Similarly, the Court 
discussed only in cursory fashion, and ultimately deferred to 
the district courts, the question of the role that patent validity 
should play in determining the reasonableness of the 
settlement.7 That question likely will remain a controversial 
point in an ongoing debate concerning the legitimacy of reverse 
payment settlements, and how it is resolved will shape the 
impact that Actavis ultimately will have on innovation within 
and beyond the pharmaceutical industry. 
I. THE COURT’S DECISION CLARIFIES THE LEGAL 
STANDARD APPLICABLE TO REVERSE PAYMENT 
SETTLEMENTS AND SHOULD PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY 
FOR COMPANIES AND COURTS 
First and foremost, Actavis brings clarity to the antitrust 
treatment of Hatch-Waxman settlements involving 
consideration flowing from innovator companies to generic 
competitors.8 Prior to the Court’s decision, several circuit 
courts of appeal had split on the issue of the appropriate lens 
through which to evaluate these agreements.9 
Three courts of appeals—the Eleventh Circuit,10 the 
Second Circuit,11 and the Federal Circuit12—had adopted a 
                                                          
 4. Id. at 2237. 
 5. Id. at 2231. 
 6. Id. at 2236. 
 7. Id. at 2236–37. 
 8. Id. at 2231, 2237–38. 
 9. Id. at 2230. 
 10. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), 
rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
2014] IMPLICATIONS OF FTC V. ACTAVIS 137 
 
“scope of the patent” approach in the context of antitrust 
challenges to reverse payment settlements. Under the scope of 
the patent analysis, a settlement that fell within the 
exclusionary potential of the patent would essentially be 
immune from antitrust attack unless the patent was obtained 
by fraud or the underlying litigation was a sham.13 This 
approach focused on the need to give full effect to the 
exclusionary power of a presumptively valid patent. It also 
placed a high value on resolving disputes through settlement 
versus protracted litigation.14 
In contrast, the Third Circuit had held that settlements 
containing a transfer of value from the innovator company to 
the generic were presumptively illegal and that courts 
reviewing such agreements should proceed under a “quick look” 
approach.15 The “quick look” approach effectively mimics a 
statutory presumption of illegality. It rests on the premise that, 
barring convincing evidence from defendants of the 
procompetitive effects of the settlement agreement, all so-called 
reverse payment settlements should be found to violate the 
antitrust law.16 
In Actavis, the Court rejected both the scope of the patent 
and the “quick look” approaches and opted instead for the more 
conventional rule of reason analysis.17 The rule of reason, the 
Court explained, strikes the proper balance between the goals 
of the patent system and those of the antitrust laws.18 Under 
the rule of reason approach, courts weigh a multitude of factors 
including “likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, 
market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations 
                                                          
 11. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litg., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
 12. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litg., 544 F.3d 1323, 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 13. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (citing Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 and 
describing the Second Circuit and Federal Circuit approaches as “similar”). 
 14. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (“There is no question that settlements provide a number of private 
and social benefits as opposed to the inveterate and costly effects of 
litigation.”). 
 15. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214–18 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 16. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 17. Id. at 2230–31, 2237–38. 
 18. Id. at 2231 (citing United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 
308 (1948)). 
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present in the circumstances,”19 as well as specific industry 
context.20 
Significantly, the Court unanimously rejected the 
presumption of illegality standard proposed by the FTC.21 
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer concluded that so-
called reverse payment patent settlements are too complex to 
meet the criterion for applying a presumptive rule.22 Thus, the 
Court held that a presumption of illegality is not appropriate 
and the FTC must prove its case as in traditional rule of reason 
cases.23 The dissenting Justices would have adopted the scope 
of the patent approach but joined the majority in inexorably, if 
implicitly, rejecting the FTC’s proposed presumption of 
illegality standard.24 
In its preference for traditional rule of reason analysis, 
Actavis is consistent with the Court’s precedent that conduct 
may be condemned using a “quick look” presumption of 
illegality only when “an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the 
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect 
on customers and markets.”25 In California Dental, the Court 
held that “quick look” treatment was inappropriate because the 
challenged restrictions “might plausibly be thought to have a 
net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on 
competition.”26 
Likewise, there is no basis to believe that settlements that 
include consideration flowing from the innovator to the generic 
company inevitably have an anticompetitive effect. The Court 
recognized this explicitly, noting that “offsetting or redeeming 
virtues are sometimes present” in reverse payment 
settlements; for example, the payment may reflect avoided 
litigation costs or “compensation for other services that the 
                                                          
 19. Id. at 2231. 
 20. Id. at 2237. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 2243 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Our cases establish that 
antitrust law has no business prying into a patent settlement so long as that 
settlement confers to the patent holder no monopoly power beyond what the 
patent conferred—unless, of course, the patent was invalid, but that . . . is a 
question of patent law, not antitrust law.”). 
 25. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 26. Id. at 771. 
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generic has promised to perform—such as distributing the 
patented item or helping to develop a market for that item.”27 
Ultimately, by refusing to draw any bright lines in favor of or 
against these types of settlements, the Court determined that, 
as with most antitrust cases, lower courts should have the 
flexibility to review the details and likely consequences of the 
agreements on a case by case basis.28 The rule of reason 
analysis allows trial courts to “structure antitrust litigation so 
as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories too 
abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the other, 
consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the 
minimal light it may shed . . . .”29 
II. THE COURT’S PERCEPTION THAT THE SIZE OF THE 
REVERSE PAYMENT MAY SERVE AS A PROXY FOR THE 
STRENGTH OF THE PATENT FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR 
THE DYNAMICS OF HATCH-WAXMAN LITIGATION 
In defending the administrability of a rule of reason 
standard in the context of reverse payment settlements, the 
Court stated that “the size of the unexplained reverse payment 
can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all 
without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the 
validity of the patent itself.”30 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court did not appear to take into account either the unique 
structure and incentives associated with the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (better 
known as “the Hatch-Waxman Act”)31 or the way that those 
elements drive Hatch-Waxman litigation.  
The Hatch-Waxman Act granted certain intellectual 
property protections to innovators to preserve incentives for 
innovation, and at the same time, created a pathway for and 
incentives to bring generic drugs to market.32 The Act allows 
                                                          
 27. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 2238. 
 30. Id. at 2236–37. 
 31. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 32. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–71 
(1990) (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act had dual goals of restoring to 
innovators the patent protection lost during the regulatory approval process 
and allowing competing generic companies to conduct, during the patent term, 
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generic drug makers to obtain regulatory approval to market 
generic drugs using a radically less expensive and faster 
process than that required of innovator drug companies, 
wherein the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 
essentially piggy-backs on the innovator’s new drug application 
(NDA).33 In contrast to the huge sums spent on bringing an 
innovator drug to market, the cost of preparing and filing an 
ANDA is about $1 million.34 Firms pursuing this approach 
must show only that their generic product has the same active 
ingredients and is bioequivalent to a reference drug that 
previously has been approved.35 Further, a company can seek 
approval from the FDA to market the generic drug before the 
expiration of a patent relating to the innovator drug by 
certifying that the patent in question is invalid or not infringed 
by the generic product (a “Paragraph IV certification”).36 The 
Hatch-Waxman Act also grants 180 days of marketing 
exclusivity to the first generic company (or companies) to 
challenge an innovator’s patents and gain FDA approval for its 
product.37 
From the standpoint of the generic company, one of the 
most attractive features of the Hatch-Waxman Act is the 
ability to initiate a challenge to the patent without incurring 
any liability in doing so. The Act includes a provision that 
allows companies to develop information to submit to the FDA 
without these activities constituting patent infringement.38 
Filing a Paragraph IV certification, in and of itself, constitutes 
an act of patent infringement that enables the innovator to 
bring a patent infringement suit.39 The generic challenger is 
not required to bring products to market as a prerequisite to 
the challenge, and therefore, the patent holder does not sustain 
                                                          
otherwise infringing activity necessary to gain regulatory approval); Emily 
Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 260–
64 (2012). 
 33. See, e.g.,Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296–
98 (11th Cir. 2003) (summarizing Hatch-Waxman Act provisions). 
 34. Morris, supra note 32, at 262. 
 35. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059 n.2 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). 
 36. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012). 
 37. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 38. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 39. Id. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
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any damages.40 Thus, the generic drug company’s chief risks in 
challenging a patent typically are confined to the legal fees and 
FDA filing expenses that it may not recover (or may recover 
only after patent expiration) if it loses the litigation. 
Ultimately, this combination of factors in the Hatch-
Waxman Act creates significant incentives for generic drug 
companies to challenge patents even where the patent holder is 
highly likely to prevail in court. The result of these skewed 
incentives under the Hatch-Waxman framework is striking. In 
its study of authorized generic drugs, the Federal Trade 
Commission stated that “for a drug with [annual] brand sales 
of $130 million, a generic that does not anticipate [authorized 
generic] competition will expect a patent challenge to be 
profitable if it has at least a 4 percent chance of winning . . . .”41 
But even this statistic vastly understates the magnitude of 
generic drug companies’ skewed incentives. Most innovator 
drugs have annual sales well over $130 million. According to 
one analysis, for almost 90% of innovator drug sales (measured 
in dollars), a first-filing generic challenger balancing upside 
gain under Hatch-Waxman against downside risk limited to 
litigation costs can justify filing a Paragraph IV certification if 
it believes it has a 3% chance of success in a patent case.42 
When a drug with significant sales is involved, it is 
economically rational for a generic company to challenge the 
patent even if there is virtually no reason to think that the 
patent is infirm.43 Statistics regarding the number of 
                                                          
 40. See Gerald Sobel, Consideration of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases 
Challenging Hatch-Waxman Act Settlements, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 47, 51 (2010) 
(“Unlike the usual patent case, there are ordinarily no damages claims against 
the generic because Hatch-Waxman forces the litigation to occur in the period 
prior to marketing by the generic. As a result, no sales or profits are lost by 
the patentee to the generic. While patent infringement suits are often settled 
by compromise of a damages claim, that vehicle is typically not available in 
Hatch-Waxman cases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 41. FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-
TERM IMPACT, at iii n.7 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/
2011genericdrugreport.pdf. 
 42. Kelly Smith & Jonathan Gleklen, Generic Drugmakers Will Challenge 
Patents Even When They Have a 97% Chance of Losing: The FTC Report that 
K-Dur Ignored, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2012, at 2. 
 43. See Morris, supra note 32, at 269 (“In effect, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
actually makes pharmaceutical patents weaker than any other type of patent 
by making challenges to pharmaceutical patents easier and more attractive 
than for any other type of patent.”). 
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Paragraph IV certifications prove this point. According to 
research by Duke University economist Henry Grabowski and 
colleagues, 64% of innovative medicines faced a Paragraph IV 
patent challenge in 2008, up from just 9% in 1995.44 Moreover, 
given the incentives to challenge patents, it is not unusual for 
drugs to attract multiple generic challengers.45 While one could 
argue that the proliferation of patent challenges is nothing 
more than an intended consequence of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
there is evidence that these challenges also have produced 
unintended negative impacts on innovation and the value of 
patents.46 
Needless to say, the Hatch-Waxman litigation dynamics, 
which the Court in Actavis did not address, create significant 
challenges for innovator companies. Companies with extensive 
product portfolios must somehow manage the risks inherent in 
multiple challenges, many of which subject their most 
successful patents to the vagaries of litigation. The threats may 
be even greater for smaller pharmaceutical companies, “whose 
entire market value rests on protecting the patent rights that 
support a handful of products.”47 For these companies, “the 
uncertainty of litigation can be untenable—even when the 
company has no doubt about the validity, scope, and term of its 
patents.”48 Under these circumstances, it should not be 
surprising—nor should it be seen as an admission of weak 
                                                          
 44. Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Generic Drug 
Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH 
AFF. 2157, 2161 (2011). 
 45. See Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 377 (2010); 
Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust 
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 520–21 (2007) 
(“Highly profitable drugs with tremendous therapeutic utility should and do 
generally attract multiple generic challengers.”); see also Smith & Gleklen, 
supra note 42 (showing FTC data on incentives for generic firms that do not 
enjoy the benefit of 180-day exclusivity). 
 46. At least one study suggests that Paragraph IV challenges by generic 
manufacturers have shortened effective patent lives by at least 1.5 years, and 
that this held true regardless of whether the challenges were successful. 
Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market 
Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
491, 501 (2007). 
 47. CHARLES-ANDRÉ BROUWERS ET AL., BOS. CONSULTING GRP., 
EMERGING BIOPHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES: ENSURING A FAVORABLE 
ENVIRONMENT FOR CONTINUED INNOVATION 12 (2011). 
 48. Id. 
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patents—that many pharmaceutical innovators quite 
reasonably choose to settle some Hatch-Waxman challenges, 
even on terms that include providing considerable value to a 
generic competitor.49 
The complex nature of reverse payment settlements 
themselves further calls into question whether the size of the 
payment could fairly be used as a proxy for patent strength. 
The Court in Actavis posits a scenario where an innovator 
earns $50 million profits per year for its product, with ten more 
years remaining on the patent.50 The Court points out that a 
verdict that the patent is invalid or not infringed would cost the 
patentee $500 million.51 The Court then contemplates a 
settlement that includes an unspecified payment to the generic 
and an unspecified generic entry date that ultimately “keeps 
prices at patentee-set levels, potentially producing the full 
patent-related $500 million monopoly return while dividing 
that return between the challenged patentee and the patent 
challenger.”52 But this hypothetical only makes sense if the 
settlement provides that the generic enters the market at a 
date that is very close to patent expiration; that is the only way 
that the innovator could realize the full $500 million in profits. 
In reality, settlements often permit generic entry substantially 
before patent expiration.53 Further, the so-called reverse 
                                                          
 49. Both within and outside of the Hatch-Waxman context, settlement is 
by far the most common method of resolving a patent dispute. See Marc G. 
Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements & the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1048 (2004) (finding that across all patent cases, 95% 
are resolved by settlement). 
 50. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2234–35. 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 2229 (describing Solvay’s settlement with generic 
companies Actavis, Par, and Paddock, where generics obtained licenses to 
market their products beginning August 31, 2015, sixty-five months before 
Solvay’s patent expired); Brief for the Generic Pharmaceutical Association as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 769341 (describing the settlement that 
provided for entry of generic Lipitor five years before patent expiration, at 
projected consumer savings of billions of dollars per year); Brief of Generic 
Manufacturers Upsher-Smith Laboratories et al., as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 23–24, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) 
(No. 12-416), 2013 WL 769339 (describing a settlement wherein one generic 
version of tamoxifen came to market nine years before patent expiration, 
while three generic companies subsequently litigated and lost patent 
challenges on the same drug). 
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payments incorporated into settlements often relate to 
ancillary agreements for products or services to be provided by 
the generic, in contrast to the Court’s hypothetical naked 
payment for staying off the market.54 As the Court later 
acknowledged, district courts must view any “payment” from 
the innovator to the generic in context, taking into account all 
elements of the settlement in order to assess the 
reasonableness of the agreement.55 
III. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE PATENT’S STRENGTH 
ARE LIKELY TO BE CRITICAL TO EVALUATING THE 
REASONABLENESS OF A REVERSE                       
PAYMENT SETTLEMENT 
The Court’s statements about the size of the reverse 
payment and its relationship to patent strength may be read as 
an indication that the FTC could prove its prima facie case—at 
least in certain circumstances—without submitting evidence 
regarding the validity of the patent. However, the Court also 
noted that when evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, 
“‘the quality of proof required should vary with the 
circumstances.’”56 There is nothing in the Court’s opinion that 
prohibits an antitrust defendant from arguing that a reverse 
payment did not harm competition because it secured a 
settlement that included early entry for the generic, in contrast 
to the likely alternative outcome where the innovator would 
have won the underlying patent litigation and prevented 
generic entry until patent expiration. 
                                                          
 54. See, e.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (noting that companies’ 
settlement agreements described payments “as compensation for other 
services the generics promised to perform . . . .”); Holman, supra note 45, at 
498 (“In many cases the ‘payment’ comes in the form of a side deal, i.e., an 
agreement ancillary to the patent settlement.”). 
 55. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (noting that complexities inherent in 
reverse payment settlements support the conclusion that “the FTC must prove 
its case as in other rule-of-reason cases”). 
 56. Id. at 2237–38 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 
(1999)); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877, 885 (2007) (under the rule of reason, “the factfinder weighs all of the 
circumstances of a case” including “specific information about the relevant 
business and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
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This is not a far-fetched or hypothetical argument of the 
sort that would shed only “minimal light”57 on the competitive 
nature of a reverse payment settlement. Patent holders often 
prevail in Hatch-Waxman litigation that proceeds to final 
judgment. Statistics show that for the 171 Paragraph IV cases 
litigated to court decisions between 2000 and 2009, innovator 
companies prevailed in 52% of them.58 More recent data on 
cases decided between 2009 and 2012 support these findings,59 
and in 2012 alone, innovator companies won 72% of Hatch-
Waxman cases.60 Even the outdated and skewed figures 
provided in the FTC’s 2002 report relied upon by reverse 
payment critics pegged the innovator’s rate of success at a non-
trivial 27.5%.61 
Beyond these aggregate numbers, cases reveal concrete 
examples of pharmaceutical patent owners that settled with 
some generics with arrangements that have been characterized 
as reverse payments and early entry and subsequently litigated 
with other generics and prevailed, keeping these later 
infringers off the market. For example, after the settlement at 
issue in the Eastern District of New York’s In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation case, the patent was 
repeatedly upheld as valid in other Hatch-Waxman litigation, 
meaning that absent the settlement, there likely would have 
                                                          
 57. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (stating that courts applying rule of reason 
may avoid “consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the 
minimal light it may shed on the basic question—that of the presence of 
significant unjustified anticompetitive consequences”). 
 58. See RBC CAPITAL MKTS. CORP., PHARMACEUTICALS: ANALYZING 
LITIGATION SUCCESS RATES 4 (2010). 
 59. Gregory Glass, Legal Defenses and Outcomes in Paragraph IV 
Litigation, 10 J. GENERIC MEDS. 4 (2013) (finding that innovator companies 
won 54% of Paragraph IV cases litigated to court decisions between 2009 and 
2012). 
 60. PWC, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE HEADLINES 
WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE 28 (2013), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-
patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
 61. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC 
STUDY 19–20 (2002) (finding that, of court decisions in litigation involving 
forty drug products from 1992–2000, the innovator prevailed against the 
generic company in litigation involving eleven drug products). See Brief of 
Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26–27, 
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 836946, for 
a discussion of the flaws in predicting modern litigation outcomes based on the 
FTC’s 2002 report. 
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been no early entry by any generic at all.62 The same outcome 
occurred after the settlements at issue in In re Tamoxifen 
Citrate Antitrust Litigation63 were reached, and the patent was 
repeatedly upheld as valid.64 Similarly, after state attorneys 
general blocked a so-called “reverse payment” settlement 
between Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) and Apotex involving the 
drug Plavix, BMS won its patent case at trial.65 
These examples demonstrate that settlements with 
consideration flowing from an innovator company to a generic 
firm may have procompetitive effects by permitting early 
generic entry that would not have otherwise occurred. This is 
not to say that all reverse payment patent settlements should 
survive antitrust scrutiny, nor that the Court necessarily erred 
in adopting a rule of reason approach over the more deferential 
scope of the patent test. Nevertheless, any approach that lower 
courts develop in evaluating reverse payment settlements 
under the rule of reason should be sufficiently expansive to 
allow defendants to prove that, in the absence of the payment, 
the innovator would have prevailed (after years of costly, 
burdensome patent litigation), and generic entry would have 
been delayed until patent expiration. In other words, courts 
should recognize that evaluating evidence pertaining to the 
strength of the underlying patent may be the only means of 
ensuring that consumers continue to reap the benefits of these 
procompetitive reverse payment agreements. 
As the Court acknowledged in Actavis, albeit in passing, 
there remains “a general legal policy favoring the settlement of 
disputes.”66 The Court downplayed the likely impact of its 
ruling on this policy, stating without support that “the fact that 
                                                          
 62. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 
514, 519–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (summarizing results of litigation where Bayer 
defeated two generic companies’ validity challenges on summary judgment 
and overcame another generic’s validity challenge after a nine-day bench 
trial). 
 63. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 64. See Zeneca Ltd. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 96-1364, 1997 WL 168318 
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 1997); Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., No. CIV.A.96-
12413-RCL, 2000 WL 34335805 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2000). 
 65. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); see also Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 323–34 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing the parties’ proposed patent settlements and the 
government’s responses to same). 
 66. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013). 
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a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability 
does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit. 
They may, as in other industries, settle in other ways . . . .”67 
The FTC has likewise argued that an alternative settlement 
may be reached in lieu of reverse payment agreements.68 But 
experts familiar with economics and the dynamics of Hatch-
Waxman litigation argue that, in at least some cases, the 
parties may be unlikely to reach a settlement in the absence of 
some consideration flowing from the innovator to the generic,69 
and neither the Court nor the FTC have rebutted these 
statements. In fact, the FTC admits—and seems pleased by the 
prospect—that some cases that may have settled with reverse 
payments would proceed to litigation if reverse payments are 
not readily available.70 But neither the Court nor the FTC have 
explained why the law should favor an alternative resolution, 
be it another settlement or patent litigation, over a 
procompetitive reverse payment agreement.71 Moreover, 
arguments that the parties could have reached an alternative 
settlement and arguments that the parties would instead have 
pursued Hatch-Waxman litigation to a likely innovator victory 
are essentially different sides of the same coin—if the former is 
relevant to the competitive effects analysis, it is hard to fathom 
how the latter is not equally relevant. 
                                                          
 67. Id. at 2237. 
 68. Brief for the Petitioner at 39–40, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 267027 [hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner]. 
 69. Dickey et al., supra note 45, at 391–97; Kent S. Bernard & Willard K. 
Tom, Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Need for 
Context and Fidelity to First Principles, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 617, 618–19, 628–31 
(2005); see also Brief of Mediation and Negotiation Professionals as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 838156 (“Modern negotiating theory and 
practice confirm that single variable negotiation [e.g., limiting parties’ 
discussion to the issue of the appropriate generic entry date] will be less likely 
to produce settlement, and less likely to produce maximum settlement value, 
than if the parties are allowed to trade multiple variables to advance their 
differently valued interests.”). 
 70. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 68, at 40 (“But in the aggregate, 
those judgments on the merits will reflect results more in keeping with the 
policies of the antitrust laws, the Patent Act, and the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments than if all the cases had been settled with reverse payments.”). 
 71. As the Supreme Court noted in another context, courts are “ill-suited 
to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other 
terms of dealing.” Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, 555 U.S. 438, 452 
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In conclusion, the rule of reason approach contemplated in 
Actavis can work to identify anticompetitive settlements 
without condemning procompetitive agreements. But this 
balance will be achieved only if courts resist the temptation to 
focus on shortcuts such as the size of the reverse payment or on 
the potential availability of alternative settlements, while 
discounting evidence pertaining to the innovator’s patent and 
the settlement as a whole that more accurately reflects the 
competitive effects of the agreements. Indeed, such a 
constrained application of the rule of reason would be little 
better than the “presumption of illegality” the Court explicitly 
rejected, insofar as it inevitably would penalize lawful patent 
enforcement strategies and chill pro-consumer settlements. 
Both the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act and fundamental 
principles of patent and antitrust law dictate an approach that 
recognizes that any agreement that allows, in the totality of the 
circumstances, early entry by an infringer that would 
otherwise be off the market for the life of the patent has a net 
procompetitive effect, regardless of the presence—or size—of a 
transfer of value from the patent holder to the infringer. 
